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Abstract—This paper addresses novel consensus problems in the presence of adversaries that can move within the network and
induce faulty behaviors in the attacked agents. By adopting several mobile adversary models from the computer science literature, we
develop protocols which can mitigate the influence of such malicious agents. The algorithms follow the class of mean subsequence
reduced (MSR) algorithms, under which agents ignore the suspicious values received from neighbors during their state updates.
Different from the static adversary models, even after the adversaries move away, the infected agents may remain faulty in their values,
whose effects must be taken into account. We develop conditions on the network structures for both the complete and non-complete
graph cases, under which the proposed algorithms are guaranteed to attain resilient consensus. Extensive simulations are carried out
over random graphs to verify the effectiveness of our approach under uncertainties in the systems.
Index Terms—Fault-tolerant distributed algorithms, Multi-agent systems, Resilient consensus, Mobile adversary agents.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, together with the fast development of communi-
cation networks, security problems have become a critical issue
in the domain of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). In such systems,
cyber attacks can cause damages not only from having important
information stolen, but also from having physical equipments and
devices manipulated, which may lead to serious faults and danger-
ous accidents. Security related problems have been investigated in
a wide range of disciplines including computer science, control,
signal processing, and robotics; see, e.g., [8], [16], [25], [26] and
the references therein.
In this paper, we follow the line of research on fault-tolerant
distributed algorithms [18], [21] and focus on resilient consensus
problems with real-valued states (e.g., [1], [5], [12]). Consensus
problems form one of the most fundamental problems in multi-
agents systems [7], [22]. There, agents locally communicate with
neighbors for arriving at the global objective to share a common
value. In uncertain environments, adversaries may attack the
agents to change their behaviors, which can result in unexpected
responses of the system and potentially keep the non-faulty regular
agents from reaching consensus at a safe value. Hence, it is of
importance to guarantee that such regular agents remain resilient
and protect themselves from adversarial attacks.
In particular, we deal with adversaries that can switch the
target agents from time to time. Such mobile adversaries can coop-
erate in a worst-case manner by communicating and collaborating
with each other even if no direct link is present among them in the
network. On the other hand, when the adversary leaves an attacked
agent, it may recover and become fault-free again. At the moment
of recovery, the value of such an agent may still be corrupted.
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However, depending on the awareness of the agent itself, it can
take different actions. For example, it can use only the neighbors’
values for starting new in the consensus process. Such a recovery
may be performed by reboot or reset of the system manually by
the system operator or automatically by devices such as watchdogs
[24].
For mobile adversaries, several models have been proposed in
the literature [2], [3], [6], [14], [27]. These models are different
in terms of the timings of attacks for the adversaries and the
capabilities of the agents recovering from attacks or infections.
Recently, by [4], [28], [30], these studies have been extended to
the case where the agents’ states take real values. However, we
must note that all of these studies are limited in two aspects:
One is that the networks are assumed to take complete graph
forms; such networks are very dense and require resources for
communications. The other is that the adversaries are assumed to
be Byzantine. Such adversaries are considered to be the worst type
as they can freely manipulate their states and are capable to send
different messages to their neighbors.
The contribution of this work is threefold: First, we extend
the mobile adversary model in the real-valued states case to the
so-called malicious adversary models. Malicious agents form a
subclass of Byzantine agents and are slightly weaker in that they
can only broadcast data, that is, they send the same data to
all neighbors. Second, we propose novel protocols for achieving
resilient consensus under three different mobile malicious models.
The protocols follow the resilient approach known as the mean
subsequence reduced (MSR) algorithms [17]. In updating their
state values, the agents ignore suspicious values sent by other
agents. Third, we consider networks in non-complete graphs and
characterize the necessary connectivity structures for the proposed
MSR-based protocols to guarantee resilient consensus.
The considered problem setting is natural from the viewpoint
of applications such as wireless sensor networks, where agents
communicate with a limited number of neighboring agents and
use broadcast transmissions. Moreover, our results have been
motivated by the recent advances made in resilient consensus
problems initiated by [19] and [32]. There, for MSR algorithms,
2tight characterizations on the network structures have been made
by introducing the notion of graph robustness. This approach has
been extended in [9], [10] for agent systems having higher-order
dynamics together with time delays in communication among the
agents. The work [11] considers the case with quantized state
values, exhibiting that randomized algorithms can enhance the ap-
plicability of the algorithms under asynchronous communication.
Further related studies can be found in, e.g., [13], [15], [29], [31],
[33], [34], [36], [38].
As mentioned above, our work follows the line of research
in computer science on fault-tolerant consensus in the presence
of mobile adversary agents. These works deal with Byzantine
adversaries and agents taking discrete state values. The early work
by [6] has proposed a model where the malicious agents can move
and switch their identities; when they move away, the recovering
agents are cured from infections immediately and can be treated
as regular in the next time step. Another work by [14] discusses a
more general model where the cured agent can detect the infection
at the time of recovery. Recently, other mobile adversary models
and resilient algorithms have been proposed by [3] and [27], where
detection of infection by the cured agents is not possible. We
extend these models to agents whose states take real values under
the malicious adversary model. In this case, in fact, the two models
in [3] and [27] coincide, and thus, we study three different classes
of mobile adversary models in this paper.
The conventional MSR-based algorithms for the static adver-
saries in, e.g., [10], [11], [19], [32] cannot guarantee resilient
consensus when the adversary agents are mobile. This is mainly
because the recovering agents require special attention. An inter-
esting aspect here is that regular agents should not always trust
their own state values in their memory since they may have been
corrupted if the agents just recovered from infection and are unable
to detect this fact. To mitigate the influence of such faults in the
system, in our modified MSR algorithms, the regular and recov-
ering agents treat their own values the same as their neighbors’
values. Thus, if their own values appear suspicious, they will
be removed and not used. Compared with the conventional MSR
algorithms for static models, the agents must remove more values,
and thus the network is required to possess more connectivities.
Clearly, this is the price to be paid when the adversaries become
mobile and thus more adversarial.
Early treatments of mobile adversary models can be found
in [24], which is motivated by processes of virus spreading. As
pointed out by [37], it is valuable to consider mobile adversaries
models where at each time period, the number of faulty parties is
limited by a known bound, but at each time step, the faulty parties
can change their identities. Such features lead to the phenomenon
where at each time, new faulty parties are introduced. Meanwhile,
the newly recovered parties can rejoin the normal computation
and then reach dynamic equilibrium. In [20], the approximate
Byzantine consensus problem is studied in a dynamic network,
where the nodes are mobile and can move.
The three mobile malicious models have different levels of
adversarial effects on the system. Our results clearly exhibit trade-
offs in that the required connectivities in the networks become
more strict as we assume the adversaries to have more power.
In other words, for ensuring higher resilience in the system, the
networks must possess more dense structures. Our MSR-based
approach allows us to reinterpret the recovery mechanisms for
one of the models (the M2 model of [14]), leading us to a
novel protocol with a more relaxed condition on the networks.
Specifically, we let the recovering agents to take longer time before
starting to respond as regular agents.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic
notions are introduced and then the problem considered in this
paper is formulated. We propose four resilient consensus protocols
for three different mobile malicious models in Sections 3 to 6.
In our analysis, we provide conditions for resilient consensus
and, in particular, in terms of the required network structures for
both complete and non-complete graphs. An illustrative example
is provided in Section 7 to check the effectiveness of proposed
algorithms under uncertain environments where the theoretical
assumptions may not hold. We give concluding remarks in Sec-
tion 8. A preliminary version of this paper will appear as a
conference paper [35]. The current paper contains all proofs of
the theoretical results with further developments and discussions.
Extensive simulation studies are carried out as well.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1 General Notions
Some basic notions on graphs are introduced for the analysis that
follows. Denote by G = (V ,E ) the directed graph consisting of n
nodes, where the set of nodes is V = {1,2, . . .,n} and the set of
edges is E ⊆ V ×V . The edge ( j, i)∈ E indicates that node j can
send a message to node i and is called an incoming edge of node i.
Let Ni = { j ∈ V : ( j, i) ∈ E } be the set of (incoming) neighbors
of node i. The degree di of node i is the cardinality of its neighbors
set Ni.
The path from node i1 to node ip is denoted as the sequence
(i1, i2, . . . , ip), where (i j, i j+1) ∈ E for j = 1, . . . , p−1. The graph
G is said to have a spanning tree if there exists a node from which
there are paths to all other nodes in this graph. Moreover, the graph
is said to be complete if for each pair of nodes i, j ∈ V , there are
bidirectional edges connecting them; denote such a graph by Kn.
To establish resilient consensus results, an important topolog-
ical notion is that of robustness of graphs [19].
Definition 2.1 (Robust graphs). Given r,s ∈ {0,1, . . .,n− 1}
the graph G = (V ,E ) is called (r,s)-robust, if for any two
nonempty disjoint subsets V1,V2 ⊆ V , one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
1) X rV1 = V1, 2) X
r
V2
= V2, 3)
∣∣X rV1
∣∣+ ∣∣X rV2
∣∣≥ s,
where X r
Vi
is the set of all nodes in Vi with at least r neighbors
outside Vi for i = 1,2. Graphs with (r,1)-robustness are said
to be r-robust as well.
We summarize some basic properties of robust graphs [19].
Here, the ceil function ⌈y⌉ gives the smallest integer greater than
or equal to y.
Lemma 2.1. An (r,s)-robust graph G satisfies the following:
1) The graph G is (r′,s′)-robust, where 0≤ r′ ≤ r, 1≤ s′ ≤ s,
and in particular, it is r-robust.
2) The graph G has a directed spanning tree. Moreover, it is
1-robust if and only if it has a directed spanning tree.
3) It holds r ≤ ⌈n/2⌉. Furthermore, if r = ⌈n/2⌉, G is a
complete graph.
4) The degree di for i∈ V is lower bounded as di ≥ r+ s−1
if s< r and di ≥ 2r−2 if s≥ r.
Moreover, a graph G is (r,s)-robust if it is (r+ s−1)-robust.
3The usefulness of this notion in the context of consensus can
be seen from item 2) in the lemma; it is a generalization of graphs
containing directed spanning trees, which is central to consensus
problems without adversaries [7], [22].
2.2 Mobile Malicious Agents and Resilient Consensus
We consider a multi-agent system with n agents interacting over
the directed graph G = (V ,E ). Each node i ∈ V has a state xi(k),
which takes a real value. The objective of consensus is that starting
from initial values xi(0), all agents update their states iteratively
by communicating with their neighbors so as to arrive at the same
value as limk→∞ |xi(k)− x j(k)|= 0 for i, j ∈ V .
In this paper, we study multi-agent systems situated in an
uncertain and even hostile environment. Some of the agents are
faulty and/or adversarial. Such agents do not execute the given
algorithm properly and may even update their states arbitrarily
with the intension to disturb the ongoing consensus process. We
introduce a new class for such faulty agents, which is called the
mobile malicious model. Informally, this class has the following
three features:
1) Adversarial agents may transmit their false states to their
neighbors through broadcasting, i.e., all neighbors of a
malicious agent receive the same data from it.
2) The identity of the malicious agents can switch over time.
That is, an attacker may turn a non-adversarial agent into
a malicious one at certain time instants.
3) A malicious agent may recover and become regular. The
agent is said to be in the cured status at that moment. This
happens when the attacker decides to switch to another
non-adversarial agent.
This model is said to be mobile to indicate that the attacker
may switch between different agents in infecting them. In this
work, we treat the mobile agents deterministically though the
mobile behaviors share similarities with the stochastic models
studied for spreading processes of infectious diseases (e.g., [23]).
We provide more notations and notions for the mobile models
considered in this paper. At each time k, the set V of nodes is
partitioned into two subsets: The set R(k) of regular agents and
the set A (k) of adversarial agents. In the static case, both sets
R(k) and A (k) remain invariant over time.
The faulty and abnormal behaviors of the adversarial agents
are defined below.
Definition 2.2 (Adversarial agents). Three classes of adversarial
agents are given as follows:
1) (Byzantine): An adversarial agent i ∈ A (k) is said to be
Byzantine if it makes updates in its value xi(k) arbitrarily
and may send different values to its neighbors each time
a transmission is made.
2) (Malicious): An adversarial agent i ∈ A (k) is said to be
malicious if it makes updates in its value xi(k) arbitrarily
and sends the same value to all of its neighbors each time
a transmission is made.
3) (Omissive): An adversarial agent is said to make omissive
faults if it does not send any value to any of its neighbors
at times when transmissions are to be made.
In this work, we focus on the class of malicious agents,
and thus our results cannot be directly applied to networks with
Byzantine agents. It is clear that Byzantine adversary agents have
more capability than malicious agents. However, the notion of
malicious agents is relevant to many applications. For example,
in wireless sensor networks, each sensor node communicates by
broadcasting its data, and hence its neighbors receive the same
state data. Also, in groups of mobile robots, the robots may
determine their neighbors’ positions through measurements by on-
board sensors [22].
Compared to the classical Byzantine models, malicious models
have received more attention only recently; see, e.g., [9], [19].
Different from the static version of malicious models studied there,
mobile adversaries can exhibit more variety in their behaviors.
As we discuss later, we will adopt three classes of such mobile
adversary models from the literature, where Byzantine-type agents
have been studied.
Under the mobile adversary model, the identity of the adver-
saries may switch, but we limit their influence by bounding the
total number of them in the network over time. More specifically,
we assume the knowledge of an upper bound on the total number
of such agents. This is called the f -total model as defined below.
Definition 2.3 (f-total). The mobile adversarial set A (k) follows
the f -total model if |A (k)| ≤ f for all k, where f ∈ N.
For the multi-agent system in the presence of mobile adversary
agents, we introduce the notion of resilient consensus. Denote the
maximum and minimum values of the states of regular agents by
x(k) =max{xi(k) : i ∈R(k)},
x(k) =min{xi(k) : i ∈R(k)},
(1)
respectively. These values are well defined as long as regular
agents are present in the network (i.e., R(k) 6= /0). To achieve
resilient consensus, these are the values that should eventually
become the same in our problem setting.
Definition 2.4 (Resilient consensus). If for any possible sets
and behaviors of the mobile malicious agents in A (k) and
any initial state values of the regular agents, the following
conditions are satisfied, then the multi-agent system is said to
reach resilient consensus:
1) Safety condition: Set the interval S = [x(0),x(0)] ⊂ R
containing the initial states of all regular agents at initial
time. Then, it holds xi(k) ∈S for all i ∈R(k), k ∈ Z+.
2) Consensus condition: The regular agents eventually take
the same value as limk→∞ x(k)− x(k) = 0.
The objective of this paper is to develop distributed algorithms
for the regular agents in the system to reach resilient consensus
as defined above. This problem is an extension of those studied in
[1], [9], [19], which are limited to the static adversary models.
Under the mobile adversary model, the notion of resilient
consensus is slightly different from the static case. Since the agents
may become malicious at any time, even if after accomplishing
consensus, an agent taking the consensus value may suddenly
change its value. In fact, not only the agents in the adversary status,
but also those in the recovering status need not be in consensus
with other regular agents. In the definition above, however, the
safety interval S remains invariant to time and is determined by
the regular agents at the start time k = 0.
To mitigate the influence of the adversaries, we develop mod-
ified versions of the so-called mean subsequence reduced (MSR)
algorithms. For the static malicious model, such algorithms are
known to be capable of realizing resilient consensus. The basic
update rule for regular agents remains the same as outlined below.
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Fig. 1. Mobile adversary models for the malicious agents case
For the state updates in the MSR algorithm, each agent
executes three basic steps [19]: Send, collect, and update. At time
(or round) k, first, a regular agent i broadcasts its current value
xi(k) to its neighboring agents. Second, it collects the values of
the neighbor agents x j(k) for j ∈ Ni. Third, after preprocessing
to delete some of the neighbor values, its value is updated to
xi(k+1). For the third step of state update, the update rule for the
state xi(k) of each regular agent i is given by
xi(k+1) = xi(k)+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)
ai j(k) (x j(k)− xi(k)) , (2)
where the weights must satisfy ai j ∈ [γ ,1) with γ ∈ (0,1/2) and
∑ j∈Mi(k) ai j(k) ≤ 1. Here, Mi(k) denotes the subset of agent i’s
neighbor set Ni, whose states take safe values; informally, among
the neighbors, the f largest and the f smallest values are removed
to mitigate the influence of the malicious agents.
It is known that to guarantee resilient consensus by the MSR
algorithm under the f -total model, it is necessary and sufficient
that the network topology satisfies a condition expressed in terms
of its connectivity. More specifically, the network must have the
property to be ( f + 1, f + 1)-robust, as defined in Definition 2.1;
see, e.g., [9], [19].
However, we can show that mobile adversary agents can easily
destroy resilient consensus if the conventional approach for the
static f -total model is directly applied. (For numerical simulations
showing such properties, see Section 7.3.) One issue is related to
the presence of the recovering nodes. Suppose that, at one time,
the adversary moves to a different regular agent, which becomes
malicious. At this moment, the agent which was infected now
recovers and becomes regular. Such a recovering node might have
a corrupted value left in its memory from the attack. Note that in
this round, there are more than f agents taking abnormal values
in the network even though each attacker is capable to infect only
one agent at a time.
In our analysis, it is more convenient to use an alternative
expression of the update rule (2). Let the self-weight be given
by aii(k) = 1−∑ j∈Mi(k) ai j(k) and the extended neighbor set by
M
+
i (k) ⊂ {i}∪Mi(k); the set may contain the index of node i
itself, in which case aii(k) ≥ γ holds. Then, we can rewrite the
update rule (2) as
xi(k+1) = aiixi(k)+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)
ai j(k)x j(k)
= ∑
j∈M+i (k)
ai j(k)x j(k). (3)
2.3 Models for Mobile Malicious Behaviors
Here, we introduce three classes of mobile malicious behaviors
denoted as models M1, M2, and M3. The differences are related
to what happens when an adversary moves to another agent and,
especially, to whether the recovering agent is aware that it was
attacked and its state data may be corrupted. These classes are
taken from the literature in computer science for the Byzantine
adversaries. We introduce the versions adapted for the malicious
adversaries case.
The three classes of mobile malicious models are defined as
follows (see Fig. 1):
M1 Buhrman’s model [6]: The adversary may move away
from an attacked agent i only at the sending step in each
round k (Fig. 1(b)). At such a round, agent i broadcasts its
corrupted state xi(k) to its neighbors, but then becomes
recovered immediately; thus, agent i collects and updates
its state as a regular node. For this reason, agent i will be
classified as regular in this round k, i.e., i ∈R(k). If the
adversary moved from agent i to another agent j after the
send step, then we have j ∈A (k). It is important to note
that at each round, there are at most f faulty values in the
network.
M2 Garay’s model [14]: This model is characteristic in that
each agent has an additional variable, the cured flag θi(k);
initially, it is set as θi(0) = 0. The adversary can move
away from an attacked agent i to agent j at any step in
each round k (Fig. 1(c)). Then, agent i is classified as
adversarial at round k, i.e., i ∈ A (k), and as regular in
the next round k+ 1, i.e., i ∈ R(k+ 1). In round k+ 1,
agent i is aware that it was infected and sets its flag as
θi(k+ 1) = 1. It is set back to θi(k+ 1) = 0 after the
update step in round k+ 1. At each round, there are at
most f faulty values and f missing values in the network.
The cured flag can be used, e.g., to decide whether to
make transmissions or not.
M3 Bonnet’s model [3]: As in M2 above, under this model,
the adversary agent can move away from an attacked
agent i at any step during each round k (Fig. 1(d)). Thus,
we have i∈A (k) and i∈R(k+1). At round k+1, agent i
is in the recovering state, but is not aware that it was
infected. It hence makes the next update as usual. In this
case, there are at most 2 f faulty values in the network:
f of them are due to attacks and the remaining f from
cured agents like agent i.
To deal with each of these models, we provide four protocols
in the following sections.
3 PROTOCOL 1 FOR THE M1 MODEL
3.1 Modified MSR Algorithm 1
Here, we present the first protocol for the mobile adversaries,
which is a modified version of the MSR algorithm from, e.g.,
5[9], [19]. It will be shown that this protocol is effective to deal
with mobile malicious agents under the model M1 from [6].
Protocol 1. At each round k, regular agent i ∈ R(k) executes the
following three steps:
1. (Send) Agent i broadcasts its current value xi(k).
2. (Collect) Agent i collects the values x j(k) of neighbors
j ∈Ni.
3. (Update) (a) Agent i sorts the received values and its own
state value in a descending order.
(b) After sorting, agent i deletes the f largest and the
f smallest values. The deleted data will not be used in
the update. The set of indices of agents whose values
remained is written as M+i (k)⊂ {i}∪Ni.
(c) Finally, agent i updates its value by (3).
A unique feature of this algorithm is that agent i might not
use its own value. This is because in Step 3, 2 f values are deleted
regardless of the value of agent i. By contrast, in the conventional
algorithms for the static adversary models in [9], [19], the number
of values to be removed depends on the current value of agent i.
Specifically, if agent i’s value is among the largest f (respectively,
the smallest f ), then only those greater (respectively, smaller) than
xi(k) are deleted.
3.2 Protocol 1 for the M1 Model: Complete Graphs
We establish that with Protocol 1, we can achieve resilient con-
sensus under the M1 model. Here, we first present the result for
networks in the complete graph form. More general graphs will be
treated in the next subsection.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the multi-agent system whose network
G forms a complete graph. Suppose that the mobile malicious
agents follow the f -total and M1 model. Then, the regular
agents using Protocol 1 reach resilient consensus if and only
if n≥ 2 f +1.
Before providing the proof, we introduce a few notations that
will be commonly used in the proofs of several results in the paper.
Denote the maximum difference among the values of the regular
nodes at time k by
V (k) = x(k)− x(k). (4)
Next, given k with V (k) > 0, let the sequence ε(k′) for k′ ≥ k be
given by
ε(k′+1) = γε(k′), (5)
where ε(k) = V (k)/2 > 0. Since γ ∈ (0,1/2), it holds 0 ≤
ε(k′+ 1) ≤ ε(k′) for k′ ≥ k. Then, define the two sets X (k,k′)
and X (k,k′) for k′ ≥ k by
X (k,k′) =
{
j ∈ V : x j(k
′)> x(k)− ε(k′)
}
, (6)
X (k,k′) =
{
j ∈ V : x j(k
′)< x(k)+ ε(k′)
}
. (7)
Here, let X be the shorthand notation for X (k,k), and X for
X (k,k). Notice that these are always disjoint and contain at least
one regular agent due to ε(k)> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The necessity part is straightforward. In
the update step in Protocol 1, there are 2 f values removed by each
agent. Thus, if n≤ 2 f , then there will be no value left for updating
the states of any of the regular agents.
For the sufficient part, we must establish resilient consensus.
According to Definition 2.4, we should show that the MSR-based
Protocol 1 satisfy the two properties, the safety condition and the
consensus condition.
To prove the safety condition, we show that for each regular
agent i ∈ R(k), the updated value xi(k+ 1) lies inside the range
[x(k),x(k)] determined by the regular values at round k. By
definition of x(k) and x(k) in (1), it holds xi(k)∈ [x(k),x(k)] for all
regular agents i ∈R(k). Based on the deleting in Step 3 during the
update in Protocol 1 and the f -total model, for each regular i, if
any neighbor j ∈Ni has a value x j(k) not in [x(k),x(k)], then this
value is deleted as j /∈M+i (k). Similarly, if agent i is recovering,
then there is a chance that its own value xi(k) is corrupted and
is outside the interval [x(k),x(k)] due to attacks in the previous
round. However, in such cases, this will be deleted in Protocol 1 as
well. Thus, by (3), the new state xi(k+1) is a convex combination
of values in [x(k),x(k)] and thus will remain in this interval.
Next, we must show the consensus condition. In this part, we
fix k ≥ 0. Assume that consensus is not attained at this round k,
i.e., V (k)> 0. Then, introduce the two sets X (k,k′) and X (k,k′)
from (6) and (7), respectively. Since the graph is complete with
n ≥ 2 f + 1, for any agent i following Protocol 1, it sorts at least
2 f + 1 values consisting of those received from its neighbors and
its own, and then removes 2 f of them. Hence, at least one value
from them must remain, so the extended neighbor set M+i (k)
is nonempty. Now, we partition this neighbor set M+i (k) into
two sets M+i (k)\X (k,k) and M
+
i (k)∩X (k,k). At least, one
of them must be nonempty. Suppose that M+i (k)\X (k,k) is
nonempty. Then, from (3), it holds
xi (k+1) = ∑
j∈M+i (k)∩X
ai j (k)x j (k)+ ∑
j∈M+i (k)\X
ai j (k)x j (k)
≤ (1− γ)x(k)+ γ(x(k)− ε(k)) = x(k)− γε(k)
= x(k)− ε(k+1). (8)
This indicates that agent i moves outside the set X (k,k+ 1) at
round k+ 1. Similarly, if M+i (k)∩X (k,k) is nonempty, then
agent i moves outside X (k,k+1) at round k+1.
The argument above holds for any regular agent i. Thus, at
round k+ 1, at least one of the sets X (k,k+ 1) and X (k,k+ 1)
does not contain any regular agent. Suppose that the set X (k,k+
1)∩R(k+1) is empty. Then, we have
V (k+1) = x(k+1)− x(k+1)≤ x(k)− ε(k+1)− x(k+1)
≤ x(k)− γε(k)− x(k)≤V (k)− γε(k)
=
(
1−
γ
2
)
V (k). (9)
The same bound holds if the other set X (k,k+ 1)∩R(k+ 1) is
empty as well. By repeating this argument for k = 0,1, . . ., we
conclude that V (k) ≤ (1− γ/2)kV (0)→ 0 as k → ∞. Thus, the
consensus condition is established. This completes the proof. 
This proposition can be seen as an extension of a result given
in [4], which deals with the Byzantine-type mobile adversary
model. The condition there is n ≥ 3 f + 1. This implies that
fewer adversaries can be tolerated in the network compared to
the malicious-type adversary case with n ≥ 2 f + 1 given in the
proposition above. This is intuitive since Byzantine adversaries
are more powerful. The proof technique in [4] is to transform the
problem so that a general result in [17] for static adversaries can
be applied. For Proposition 3.1, we have proved using arguments
similar to those in [9], [19], which are also for the static case. We
however remark that the advantage of this approach is that it can
be extended to non-complete graph cases as we discuss next.
63.3 Protocol 1 for the M1 Model: Non-complete Graphs
Next, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed Protocol 1
for the non-complete graph case and provide a sufficient condition
on the graph structure for achieving resilient consensus under the
M1 model.
Theorem 3.1. Consider the multi-agent system under the network
G where the mobile malicious agents follow the f -total and
M1 model. Then, the regular agents using Protocol 1 reach
resilient consensus if the following conditions are satisfied:
C1 n≥ 4 f +4.
C2 For every agent i, the number of neighbors satisfies
|Ni| ≥ 2 f +1+n/2.
Note that condition C1 in the theorem is necessary for con-
dition C2 to hold. This can be easily shown. In the graph G ,
the neighbor set of any node i satisfies |Ni| ≤ n− 1. Then,
with C2, it follows 2 f + 1+ n/2 ≤ |Ni| ≤ n− 1. From these
inequalities, we obtain 4 f +4≤ n. We observe that when applied
to complete graphs, this result exhibits some conservatism. The
bound in Theorem 3.1 is n ≥ 4 f + 4 whereas in Proposition 3.1,
it is n≥ 2 f + 1. Hence, the non-complete graph result requires a
smaller number of malicious agents in the network.
Before providing the proof of the theorem, we transform the
condition C2 on the graph structure in the lemma below.
Lemma 3.1. Consider the multi-agent network where the mobile
malicious agents follow the f -total model. Then, under n ≥
4 f + 4, the condition C2 in Theorem 3.1 holds if and only if
the following condition is satisfied:
C2′ There exists an integer g ∈ [2 f +2,n/2] such that for any
g-agent subgraph G ′ of G , each agent inside G ′ has at
least 2 f +1 neighbors from the agents in the subgraph.
Proof : We first show that the graph G satisfying C2 in
Theorem 3.1 fulfils C2′. It suffices to show this using g = ⌊n/2⌋.
By deleting any ⌈n/2⌉ agents from G , we obtain a subgraph G ′
with the remaining agents, where the number of nodes is equal
to ⌊n/2⌋ = g. Based on C2, we know that every agent in this
subgraph has at least 2 f + 1 neighbors within the subgraph G ′.
Thus, C2′ holds.
Conversely, we establish that if G satisfies C2′, then C2 holds.
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that in G , there exists an
agent i whose neighbor set Ni has cardinality |Ni| ≤ 2 f + n/2.
We then arbitrarily remove ⌊n/2⌋ neighbors of agent i from the
graph. If there are fewer than ⌊n/2⌋ neighbors, then we remove all
of them. The remaining agents form a subgraph of G consisting
of ⌈n/2⌉ nodes. However, for agent i, the number of neighbors
contained in this subgraph is no greater than 2 f . This implies that
for g= ⌈n/2⌉, the property C2′ does not hold. Moreover, if it does
not hold for g= ⌈n/2⌉, it cannot hold for any smaller value of g.

Proof of Theorem 3.1: Here, we outline the proof since it follows
along the lines similar to those in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
From there, the safety condition is clear, and it remains to show
the consensus condition.
Assume that consensus is not reached yet at round k, and
hence V (k)> 0. We introduce the two sets X (k,k′) and X (k,k′)
from (6) and (7), respectively. We use the shorthand notations
X and X , respectively, for X (k,k) and X (k,k). Then, under
conditions C1 and C2′ (from Lemma 3.1), there are two cases
to be considered: (i) |V \X | ≥ g and (ii) |V \X | < g. In the
following, we treat the case (i) and discuss the behavior of agents
in the set X . The other case (ii) can be handled similarly by
focusing on the agents in X ; this is because |X | ≤ |V \X |< g
and, thus, it follows that |V \X | ≥ n−g≥ ⌈n/2⌉ ≥ g.
For the case (i) with |V \X | ≥ g, we look at the state
behaviors of the regular agents in R(k) (including those in the
recovering status). We divide such agents into those in the sets
X and V \X . First, we consider agent i ∈X . Take a subgraph
with g agents in G , where g− 1 agents are from V \X and the
remaining one is agent i. Then, from the condition C2′, we know
that agent i receives values from at least 2 f + 1 neighbors in this
subgraph. Thus, at this round k, after the removal of 2 f agents
taking large or small state values at the update step in Protocol 1,
the set M+i (k) ∩
(
V \X
)
= M+i (k) \X is nonempty. Then,
under the update rule (3) of Protocol 1, the value xi(k+ 1) can
be upper bounded as in (8).
Next, we consider the regular agent i ∈ V \X . Due to |V \
X | ≥ g, by the condition C2′, agent i inside the subgraph V \X
has at least 2 f + 1 neighbors from the subgraph. This implies
that at the update in Protocol 1, after the removal of 2 f values,
agent i has one or more values left, that is, the set M+i (k) \X
is nonempty. Hence, we have that for each agent i ∈ V \X , the
inequality (8) holds. Therefore, we have shown that (8) holds for
each regular agent i ∈R(k). It is now guaranteed that all regular
agents are outside the set X (k,k+1) at round k+1.
Similarly, for the case (ii) with |V \X |< g, all regular agents
are outside the set X (k,k+1) at round k+1. Therefore, at round
k+1, at least one of the sets X (k,k+1) and X (k,k+1) contains
no regular agent. By establishing the bound on V (k) as in (9), we
have V (k)→ 0 as k→ ∞. 
4 PROTOCOL 2 FOR THE M2 MODEL
We proceed to present another protocol that is effective for the
M2 model from [14]. This model is different from M1 in that
the recovering agents do not send their values to neighbors since
they are aware of having been infected. This behavior can be
considered as f -total omissive. Hence, in the worst case under the
M2 model, at each round, there can be f -total malicious agents
and, in addition, f -total agents with omissive faults.
Protocol 2. At each round k, regular agent i ∈ R(k) executes the
following three steps:
1. (Send) If agent i is in the regular status with the cured
flag θi(k) = 0, then it broadcasts its current value xi(k).
Otherwise, with θi(k) = 1, it is in recovering status and
no transmission is made.
2. (Collect) Agent i collects the values x j(k) of neighbors
j ∈Ni.
3. (Update) (a) If the cured flag is θi(k) = 0, then agent i
sorts the received values and its own state value in a
descending order. Otherwise (i.e., θi(k) = 1), agent i is
recovering and sorts only the received values.
(b) After sorting, agent i deletes the f largest and the
f smallest values. The deleted data will not be used in
the update. The set of indices of agents whose values
remained is written as M+i (k)⊂ {i}∪Ni.
(c) Finally, agent i updates its value by (3).
Similarly to Proposition 3.1, we have the following result for
networks in the complete graph forms.
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forms a complete graph. Suppose that the mobile malicious
agents follow the f -total and M2 model. Then, the regular
agents using Protocol 1 reach resilient consensus if and only
if the graph satisfies n≥ 3 f +1.
In the M2 model, there may be up to f cured agents (with
θi(k) = 1), which are not allowed to send their values to neighbors.
Hence, each regular node may not receive data from some of its
neighbors. Among the data received, up to f of them may be
faulty. Protocol 2 is effective for this model since each regular
agent deletes 2 f neighbor values in Step 3. In comparison with
M1, to guarantee its resilience for M2, f more neighbors are
needed for each agent.
This argument also holds for the result extended to non-
complete graphs as shown in the theorem below.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the multi-agent system under the network
G where the mobile malicious agents follow the f -total and
M2 model. Then, regular agents using Protocol 2 reach re-
silient consensus if the following conditions are satisfied:
C1 n≥ 6 f +4.
C2 For every agent i, the number of neighbors satisfies
|Ni| ≥ 3 f +1+n/2.
We discuss the differences between Protocol 1 under M1 and
Protocol 2 under M2. Generally, the graph condition for M2 is
stricter than that for M1 because the agents in the cured status
complicate the system behavior. Furthermore, the adversary agents
in M2 are more powerful since they can move at any step during
the update rounds while in M1, they switch only at the send steps.
The main feature of M2 is that once an adversary agent
moves away, the recovering agent immediately knows that it
was infected and then avoids sending its value to neighbors. In
practice, this feature may not be easy to attain as it requires the
implementation of fault detection algorithms. To deal with such an
issue, we discuss yet another mobile adversary model M3 in the
next section. In this case, detection of cured agents is not needed.
We propose another protocol to solve resilient consensus for M3.
5 PROTOCOL 3 FOR THE M3 MODEL
We outline our resilient protocol for the M3 model from [3].
Mobile adversaries under this model have more advantages since
the recovering agents do not know about their infection. Hence,
they send their values during the cured round though they can be
corrupted. In this respect, the recovering agents can be considered
as additional f -total malicious agents in the network. As a conse-
quence, at each round, the regular agents may receive at most 2 f
corrupted values.
Protocol 3 given below copes with the additional malicious
data in the M3 model. It is a slightly modified version of Proto-
col 1. Specifically, in Step 3 at each round, 4 f values are removed
while in Protocol 1, this number is 2 f . We show that this protocol
is effective to deal with the mobile malicious agents under M3.
Protocol 3. At each round k, regular agent i ∈ R(k) executes the
following three steps:
1. (Send) Agent i broadcasts its current value xi(k).
2. (Collect) Agent i collects the values x j(k) of neighbors
j ∈Ni.
3. (Update) (a) Agent i sorts the received values and its own
value in a descending order.
TABLE 1
Mobile adversary models and networks for resilient consensus
Timing Awareness Network condition
Model of of being Complete Non-complete
infection cured graphs graphs
M1 Send – n≥ 2 f +1 n≥ 4 f +4
M2 Any Yes n≥ 3 f +1 n≥ 6 f +4
M3 Any – n≥ 4 f +1 n≥ 8 f +4
(b) After the sorting, agent i deletes the 2 f largest and
the 2 f smallest values. The deleted data will not be used
in the update. The set of indices of agents whose values
remained is written as M+i (k)⊂ {i}∪Ni.
(c) Finally, agent i ∈R updates its value by (3).
Since more values are deleted in Protocol 3, the regular agents
need more neighbors compared with the networks for Protocols 1
and 2. By an analysis similar to those in the previous sections, we
have the following results. The first is concerned with networks in
the complete graph form.
Proposition 5.1. Consider the multi-agent system whose network
forms a complete graph. Suppose that the mobile malicious
agents follow the f -total and M3 model. Then, the regular
agents using Protocol 2 reach resilient consensus if and only
if n≥ 4 f +1.
We can further deal with the non-complete graph case as
shown in the theorem below.
Theorem 5.1. Consider the multi-agent system under the network
G where the mobile malicious agents follow the f -total and
M3 model. Then, regular agents using Protocol 3 reach re-
silient consensus if the following conditions are satisfied:
C1 n≥ 8 f +4.
C2 For every agent i, the number of neighbors satisfies
|Ni| ≥ 4 f +1+n/2.
We highlight the differences of the M3 model and related
results from those for M1 and M2. First, we discuss the relation
with M1. Both M1 and M3 models do not require the functionality
to detect agents in the cured status. However, the M3 model
is more powerful since in M1, the adversary agents can move
only at the send step, while in M3, they have more flexibility
and can move at any step. This difference results in a more
restrictive condition on the network structure to guarantee resilient
consensus. We observe that each agent needs 2 f more neighbors
in M3 than in M1.
Next, we compare the M3 model with M2. In both M2 and M3
models, an adversary agent can move to another agent at any step
during the rounds. The difference comes from the detection ability
in the regular agents, and the agents in M2 are more capable in
this respect. In M2, if a regular agent is infected by an adversary, it
becomes aware as soon as the adversary moves away. In contrast,
the regular agents in M3 will never be aware of the infection, and
thus their response actions are limited.
As discussed above, we can find that the graph conditions are
related to the adversaries’ power and defenders’ ability. In Table 1,
we summarize the properties of the three models and the network
conditions for the proposed protocols obtained so far. Note that
the conditions for the non-complete graphs are partial (as only C1
in the corresponding theorems are shown).
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We note that in M2, the cured agents are guaranteed to become
regular in one round. However, to guarantee this feature, we have
to design the update rules carefully and such update rules may
require a more conservative graph condition. In the following
section, we follow the idea of extending the curing round in M2 to
multiple rounds. Then, it becomes possible to design another class
of algorithms to guarantee resilient consensus.
6 PROTOCOL 2A FOR THE M2 MODEL
One of our objectives in this work is to relax the conditions
on network structures required for resilient consensus protocols.
Towards this end, we extend our approach for the M2 model.
6.1 The M2 Model Revisited
We introduce some modifications to the M2 model and then
develop a novel resilient consensus algorithm, referred to as
Protocol 2A. Over Protocol 2 for the same mobile malicious
model, it has an advantage with respect to the requirement for
network connectivity. In M2, the regular agents have the ability
to detect whether they were infected in the previous round; if
so, their values may still be infected and thus must be ignored
in the next update. Recall the cured flag θi(k) introduced in the
M2 model. This variable is not part of the adversary model, but
rather a convention for the recovering agents. Here, our approach
is to generalize its function by letting it take three values as
θi(k) ∈ {0,1,2}. It is initially set as θi(0) = 0 for all i.
In the new algorithm here, when the adversary leaves agent i
at round k, the cured agent i will take different actions in the
following two rounds k+1 and k+2 (Fig. 2): (i) In the first round
k+1, the flag is set as θi(k+1)= 1. Agent i does not send its value
to the neighbors, but only makes an update by a rule different
from that of regular agents. (ii) In the second round k+2, the flag
becomes θi(k+ 1) = 2. Agent i again does not send it value, but
applies the same update rule as the regular agents. (iii) After the
update step in round k+ 2, the value of agent i becomes regular.
The flag is set back to zero as θi(k+3) = 0.
Technically speaking, the cured agents with θi(k) = 1 are
neither adversarial nor regular while as discussed in Section 2,
cured agents with θi(k) = 2 may be considered regular in their
update rules; thus, we include them in R(k). Hence, under this
setting, the node set V is partitioned into three sets A (k), C (k),
and R(k) at each round k, where the cured agent set C (k) is given
by
C (k) = {i ∈ V : θi(k) = 1}. (10)
The details of Protocol 2A are described below.
Protocol 2A. At each round k, regular or cured agent i ∈ R(k)∪
C (k) executes the following three steps:
1. (Send) If agent i is in the regular status with the cured
flag θi(k) = 0, then it broadcasts its current value xi(k).
Otherwise, with θi(k) = 1 or 2, it is in recovering status
and no transmission is made.
2. (Collect) Agent i collects the values x j(k) of neighbors
j ∈Ni.
3. (Update) (a) Agent i sorts the received values in a
descending order.
(b1) If the cured flag is θi(k) = 0 or θi(k) = 2, then by
comparing with its own value xi(k), agent i deletes the
f largest and the f smallest values from its neighbors. If
the number of values larger (or smaller) than xi(k) is less
than f , then all of them are deleted.
(b2) Otherwise, with θi(k) = 1, agent i deletes the f
largest and the f smallest values and will not use its own
value.
(c) The deleted data will not be used in the update. The
set of indices of agents whose values remained is written
as M+i (k)⊂ {i}∪Ni.
(d) Finally, agent i updates its value by (3).
Note that in Step 3 (b1) of Protocol 2A, the agents may remove
less than 2 f values among those received from the neighbors,
which follows the MSR approach [9], [19]. In fact, we can
establish a sufficient condition for the network topology to attain
resilient consensus based on the notion of robust graphs introduced
in Section 2.
6.2 Resilient Consensus Result
The main result for Protocol 2A is presented in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Consider the multi-agent system under the network
G where the the mobile malicious agents follow the f -total and
M2 model. Then, the regular agents using Protocol 2A reach
resilient consensus if the graph is (4 f +1,2 f +1)-robust.
Proof : We first show the safety condition part. According to the
M2 model, at any round k, there are at most f adversary agents
and f cured agents. Since the graph is (4 f + 1,2 f + 1)-robust,
by definition, each agent has more than 4 f + 1 neighbors. In the
update rule of Protocol 2A, for both regular agents and cured
agents, at most 2 f values are deleted and up to 2 f may be missing
from omissive faults (from the agents in the two cured rounds);
thus, their neighbor set Mi(k) used in the update rule (3) is
nonempty for any k.
More specifically, for each regular agent i ∈ R(k) (including
the cured case with θi(k) = 2), based on the Step 3 (b1), we know
that if any neighbor j satisfies x j(k) /∈ [x(k),x(k)], then it will
be deleted. So based on (3), we have that xi(k+ 1) ∈ [x(k),x(k)].
For each cured agent i ∈ C (k) in (10), its own value xi(k) may
be infected, and it will be deleted in Step 3 (b2); hence in the
update rule (3), we have aii(k) = 0. Thus, it follows xi(k+ 1) ∈
[x(k),x(k)]. This implies that x(k) and x(k) are nonincreasing and
nondecreasing functions of round k. From the above, it follows
that the regular and cured agents remain within the safety interval
S = [x(0),x(0)] at the end of round k.
In the rest of the proof, we must prove the consensus condition.
Here, we consider the system behavior for a fixed round k. We
use V (k) in (4) and the two sets X (k,k′) and X (k,k′) given
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in (6) and (7), respectively, where k′ ≥ k. By definition, these
two sets are disjoint and nonempty. Thus, from the assumption of
(4 f +1,2 f +1)-robustness, we have the following three cases:
1) All agents in X (k,k′) have at least 4 f+1 neighbors from
outside the set.
2) All agents in X (k,k′) have at least 4 f+1 neighbors from
outside the set.
3) The total number of agents in X (k,k′) and X (k,k′) that
have at least 4 f + 1 neighbors outside the set to which
they belong is no smaller than 2 f +1.
Here, we claim that case 3 above will eventually reduce to
case 1 or 2 in a future time; this case is illustrated in Fig. 3. In
particular, we show that the number of regular and cured agents
in X (k,k′) at round k′ ≥ k decreases over the rounds. Note that
under case 3, there are at least f + 1 regular agents (including
cured agents with θi(k) = 2) in total in X (k,k) and X (k,k) that
have at least 4 f +1 neighbors from outside the corresponding sets.
We consider the regular agents and the cured agents separately.
First, we study the regular agents, which follow the updates
in Step 3 (b1). Take one agent i ∈R(k)∩X (k,k) having at least
4 f + 1 neighbors from outside X (k,k). In the update rule (3),
partition the agents in Mi(k) into two parts as Mi(k)∩X (k,k)
and Mi(k)\X (k,k). Then, we can write
xi(k+1) = aii(k)xi(k)+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)∩X
ai j(k)x j(k)
+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)\X
ai j(k)x j(k), (11)
where X is the shorthand notation of X (k,k). Among the neigh-
bors, there are at most 2 f agents with omissive faults, and at most
f neighbors are removed. It is clear that the set Mi(k) \X (k,k)
contains regular agents. Thus, we have
xi(k+1)≤ aii(k)x(k)+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)∩X
ai j(k)x(k)
+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)\X
ai j(k) (x(k)− ε(k))
≤ x(k)− γε(k) = x(k)− ε(k+1), (12)
where the equality follows from (5). This bound indicates that at
the beginning of round k+1, agent i will be outside X (k,k+1).
On the other hand, we can show that each regular agent i
outside X (k,k) will not go inside X (k,k+ 1) at round k+ 1.
Fig. 4. Updates for regular and cured agents in case 1
This is because it holds xi(k)≤ x(k)− ε(k) and aii(k)≥ γ . Hence,
we can guarantee the upper bound (12) from (11).
Similarly, if regular agent i is in X (k,k) having 4 f + 1
neighbors from outside the set or is outside X (k,k), then we
can lower bound its state as
xi(k+1)≥ x(k)+ γε(k) = x(k)+ ε(k+1). (13)
This indicates that such agent i will be outside of X (k,k+ 1) at
the beginning of round k+1.
Next, we discuss the updates of the cured agents with θi(k) =
2. Take a cured agent i ∈ C (k)∩X (k,k) having at least 4 f + 1
neighbors outside X (k,k). Such an agent applies the deleting rule
in Step 3 (b2), where its own value is removed as
xi(k+1) = ∑
j∈Mi(k)∩X
ai j(k)x j(k)+ ∑
j∈Mi(k)\X
ai j(k)x j(k) (14)
with the self-weight aii(k) = 0. There are at most 2 f values
missing since each cured agent with θi(k) = 1,2 does not send
its value and removes at most 2 f agents outside X (k,k). So the
set Mi(k)\X (k,k) is guaranteed to be non-empty. Then, we have
from (14) and then (5)
xi(k+1)≤ x(k)− γε(k) = x(k)− ε(k+1). (15)
Thus, cured agent i will be outside X (k,k+1) in the next round.
It follows from (12), (13), and (15) that at round k+ 1, the
regular and cured agents in X (k,k) or X (k,k) having at least
4 f + 1 neighbors from outside the corresponding sets will be
outside of both X (k,k+1) and X (k,k+1); the number of such
agents is f +1 or larger due case 3 considered so far.
We now discuss the behavior of the cured agents (in C (k))
outside of both X (k,k) and X (k,k). Note that there are at most
f cured agents. For agent i ∈ C (k) \X (k,k), the update rule is
(14), and the updated value xi(k+ 1) may be inside X (k,k+ 1);
this happens, for example, if the set Mi(k) \X (k,k) is empty.
Similar results hold for agent i ∈ C (k)\X (k,k). Thus, it follows
that at most f cured agents can move inside X (k,k+ 1) or
X (k,k+1).
We summarize the arguments so far. During round k, among
the regular and cured agents in X (k,k+1) or X (k,k+1) having
4 f +1 or more links from outside the corresponding sets, at least
f + 1 of them move outside, and at most f cured agents might
move inside these sets. Hence, at least by one, the total number of
such regular and cured agents in X (k,k+ 1) and X (k,k+ 1) is
smaller than that in X (k,k) or X (k,k). Repeating this process,
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we eventually have that there is some round k+ k f such that the
total number of regular agents inside X (k,k+ k f ) and X (k,k+
k f ) is smaller than f + 1, where k f > 0 is a finite number. As
a consequence, we know from the analysis above that among the
three cases 1–3 due to the graph robustness mentioned above, only
case 1 and/or case 2 holds at round k′ = k+ k f .
Suppose that case 1 is satisfied (see Fig. 4). We show that at the
end of round k+ k f +2, the set X (k,k+ k f +2) will not contain
any regular agent or cured agent. After the updates in round k+k f ,
we know from the analysis above that all regular and cured agents
insideX (k,k+k f ) are outside the set X (k,k+k f +1). Moreover,
at most f cured agents in C (k+k f ) can be inside X (k,k+k f +1)
after the updates at k+ k f . Note that at the next round k+ k f +1,
such cured agents are in cured status with θi(k) = 2; thus, they
still do not send their values to neighbors, but make updates as
regular agents. As a consequence, at round k+ k f +1, there is no
value sent from agents in the set X (k,k+k f +1). This means that
the regular agents outside this set will not move inside X (k,k+
k f + 2) in the next update. In the meantime, the cured agents in
X (k,k+ k f + 1) move outside X (k,k+ k f + 2). It thus follows
that at round k+ k f + 2, all regular agents and cured agents are
outside X (k,k+ k f + 2). Similar arguments also hold for agents
in the set X (k,k+ k f ). Therefore, at the end of round k+ k f +2,
at least, one of the two sets X (k,k+k f +2) and X (k,k+k f +2)
is empty of regular and cured agents.
First, consider the case for X (k,k+ k f + 2) containing no
regular/cured agents. Then, we have for all i ∈R(k).
xi(k+ k f +2)≤ x(k)− γ
k f+2ε(k).
It thus follows that
x(k+ k f +2)≤ x(k)− γ
k f+2ε(k).
Recall that x(k) is nonincreasing and x(k) is nondecreasing based
on the update rule (3). Hence,
V (k+ k f +2) = x(k+ k f +2)− x(k+ k f +2)
≤ x(k)− γk f+2ε(k)− x(k) =
(
1−
γk f+2
2
)
V (k). (16)
Note that the analysis is similar for the other case where X (k,k+
k f +2) is empty of regular/cured agents. That is, the bound in (16)
holds in either case. Repeating this argument, we have
V (k+ l(k f +2))≤
(
1−
γk f+2
2
)l
V (k).
Therefore, we have V (k)→ 0 as k → ∞ and thus the consensus
condition holds. 
In Theorem 6.1, the sufficient condition for resilient consensus
is expressed in terms of the graph condition based on the notion
of robustness. The analysis follows approaches employed in the
recent literature on MSR algorithms for static malicious models
(e.g., [9], [19]). Compared with conventional MSR algorithms,
the proof techniques are different in mainly three aspects:
(i) Not only the adversary agents in the graph send corrupted
values, but also the cured agents exhibit non-regular behaviors by
not sending values to neighbors. Furthermore, the cured agents in
C (k) follow an update rule different from the regular agents. In
the proof, we have to separately analyze the updates of such cured
agents.
(ii) The behavior of the cured agents in C (k) is unique as
they do not obey the normal update rules for regular agents. It is
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Fig. 5. Example of a (5,3)-robust graph
interesting that the cured agents outside X (k,k) may move inside
the set X (k,k+ 1). Such responses do not occur in the analysis
of conventional MSR algorithms.
(iii) In the proof of Theorem 6.1, the set X (k,k+ k f + 2) is
shown to be empty after round k+ k f + 2. The extra two rounds
after k+ k f are needed, again, because of the behavior of cured
agents. We have shown that in the worst case, some cured agents
may first move inside the set X (k,k+ k f + 1) and then move
outside X (k,k+ k f + 2). In our result, we have to guarantee
that this set is empty of both regular and cured agents, while in
conventional studies, this is needed only for regular agents.
6.3 Discussion
We now discuss the relations among the graph conditions that
appeared in our results in this paper.
6.3.1 Relation between Protocols 2 and 2A
Compared with Protocol 2, the main difference of Protocol 2A is
the relaxed deleting rules applied to the regular agents, allowing
them to use the safe values are more efficiently. More specifically,
as the cured agents refrain from sending their values for two
consecutive rounds, among the values of the neighbors received
by each regular agent, the ratio of safe and reliable ones sent from
regular agents is higher. As a result, Protocol 2A can guarantee
resilient consensus for more sparse networks in comparison with
the non-complete graph case for Protocol 2. In particular, for a
fixed number f of malicious agents, as the network size becomes
larger, the connectivity condition for Protocol 2A in Theorem 6.1
may become less than that for Protocol 2 in Theorem 4.1; recall
that the latter result requires every agent to have at least n/2
neighbors. Moreover, the graph condition for Protocol 2A is
determined only by f .
We demonstrate the differences between Protocols 2 and 2A
through two examples. The first is related to the graph conditions
in the two theorems. Consider networks with ten agents (n = 10)
with one mobile malicious agent ( f = 1). It is easy to check that
in this case, the conditions for Protocol 2 in Theorem 4.1 are
satisfied only under the complete graph since the required number
of neighbors for each agent is 3 f + 1+ n/2 = 9. On the other
hand, the non-complete graph shown in Fig. 5 with ten nodes
is (5,3)-robust and thus satisfies the condition with f = 1 for
Protocol 2A in Theorem 6.1. In this graph, nodes 2–10 form a
clique (i.e., a complete subgraph), but among them, only nodes
2–9 have directed edges (in blue) towards agent 1. Note that all
agents have only eight (incoming) neighbors.
In the next example, we illustrate how Protocol 2A can
achieve resilient consensus while Protocol 2 cannot because of the
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TABLE 2
Properties of adversary models and algorithms
Adversary Algorithm # deleted # cured values Network condition
model values not transmitted (with s≥ 0)
Static model Conventional MSR From 0 to 2 f 0 ( f +1, f +1)-robust
M1 Protocol 1 2 f 0 Part of (2 f +1,s)-robust
M2 Protocol 2 2 f From 0 to f Part of (3 f +1,s)-robust
M2 Protocol 2A From 0 to 2 f From 0 to 2 f (4 f +1,2 f +1)-robust
M3 Protocol 3 4 f 0 Part of (4 f +1,s)-robust
Fig. 6. An illustration of Protocol 2A with one mobile malicious agent with
time index l ≥ 0
difference in their update rules. Here, we consider the graph shown
in Fig 6 with six agents with one mobile malicious node (i.e.,
f = 1). For our purpose, a simple graph is taken, which does not
satisfy the theoretical conditions. The graph has two nodes having
two neighbors and four nodes having four neighbors; among the
latter four nodes, the malicious agent moves around periodically,
following the M2 model. Note that the regular agents take only
positive values while the malicious agent always takes −1, which
results in the cured agent with θi(k) = 1 take the same negative
value.
At the initial step, one malicious agent and one cured agent are
present indicated by red and green, respectively. In Fig 6, the left-
most plot shows the status of the agents and their values chosen as
[1 1 1 −1 −1 3] at the start of round k = 0. Note the only agent
not in consensus at this time is the agent on the far right of the
graph taking the initial value 3; this agent will be called agent 1
with value x1(0) = 3. After the initial round, as shown in Fig 6
on the right side, the malicious agent moves periodically among
four agents in this network. Under Protocol 2, the updates will fail
even at the initial round. With f = 1, agent 1 cannot update its
value since it must have at least four values from its neighbors.
On the other hand, in Protocol 2A, each regular agent employs
an update rule based on the conventional MSR algorithm. It hence
always keeps and uses its own value in the updates. Thus, at round
k = 0, agent 1 keeps its value unchanged as x1(1) = 3, removing
the value −1 received from the malicious agent. In fact, it remains
unchanged in the following two rounds as x1(2) = x1(3) = 3,
because it does not receive enough values because of the cured
neighbors. At round k = 3, for the first time, agent 1’s value
changes to x1(4) = 2 by taking average of 1, −1, and 3. by
taking average of 1 and 3 since the value −1 is discarded by
the protocol. Due to the periodic change in the values, we can
show that agent 1 will update its value at rounds k = 4ℓ as
x1(4(ℓ+ 1)) = (x1(4ℓ)+ 1)/2 for ℓ = 0,1, . . .. while the values
of other regular agents remain at 1. Clearly, it holds x1(k)→ 1 as
k→ ∞, and thus resilient consensus will be achieved.
6.3.2 Network Conditions and Their Robustness
Next, we would like to relate the graph conditions obtained in
Theorems 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1 with robust graphs. The following
result provides the means to do so.
Proposition 6.1. For a given graph G and a nonnegative integer
r, if the number of neighbors for each node i satisfies |Ni| ≥
r+ n/2, then this graph is (r,s)-robust, where s can be an
arbitrary nonnegative integer.
Proof : At first, we take two disjoint subsets S1 and S2 of the
node set V with |S1| ≤ |S2|. There are two cases: (i) S1 contains
less than or equal to n/2 agents, and S2 contains no fewer than
n/2 agents. (ii) Both S1 and S2 contain less than n/2 agents. It
is noted that one of these sets must contain less than or equal to
n/2 agents. Then, we check every agent i in S1. Since the number
of its neighbors satisfies |Ni| ≥ r+ n/2, we easily see that every
agent inside S1 must have at least r neighbors from outside S1.
Hence, the condition 1 or 2 in Definition 2.1 must be satisfied.
Since we do not need to check condition 3, the parameter s can be
chosen arbitrarily. 
This result demonstrates that the graph conditions of Theo-
rems 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1 can be stated in terms of robust graphs. We
know that checking the robustness of large graphs is combinatorial
and thus challenging. This proposition provides a simple analytic
method to design networks with robustness properties.
Table 2 summarizes the properties of the five protocols under
the four adversary models discussed in this paper including the
conventional MSR algorithm under the static model. As shown
in the table, for example, graphs satisfying the conditions for
Protocol 1 in Theorem 3.1 have the property of (2 f + 1,s)-
robustness with any s ≥ 0. Note however that this is only a
necessary condition, and the converse does not hold in general.
That is, in (r,s)-robust graphs, each node i does not necessarily
satisfy |Ni| ≥ r+ n/2. Further, from Table 2, we can find that
as the mobile adversarial model becomes more powerful, the
required connectivity level also increases. This table also gives
a comparison between the conventional MSR for static models
and our proposed protocols for mobile models.
7 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the performance of our proposed
protocols and the conventional MSR algorithm under mobile
adversary models through a numerical example using a wireless
multi-agent network.
Our focus of the numerical experiments is to determine how
well the protocols perform under practical settings when the
assumptions introduced in the theoretical development may not
hold. Specifically, we use randomly generated networks where the
connectivity requirements are in general difficult to check due to
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Fig. 7. Wireless multi-agent network with 100 nodes (r = 20)
the size of the network. Furthermore, we consider uncertain situa-
tions regarding the information of the adversarial agents in terms
of their models and numbers. To this end, we use random graphs
with 100 nodes and change the connectivity levels to examine the
success rates for achieving resilient consensus through extensive
simulations. We also check the cases where the parameter f for
the number of adversaries may be smaller than the actual number
of such nodes; the latter number is denoted by freal in this section.
For the network topologies, we generated ten random geomet-
ric graphs with 100 nodes located in an area of 100 meters ×
100 meters randomly under the uniform distribution. Each agent
has a communication range determined by the radius r, within
which it can communicate with all agents. An example is shown
in Fig. 7 where the communication radius is chosen as r = 20.
The regular agents and their edges are drawn in blue while the
malicious agents are in red. Here, we placed 5 malicious agents,
that is, freal = 5.
In the box plot of Fig. 8, we display the distribution of the
number of each agent’s neighbors for the topology in Fig. 7 versus
the radius r. For each r, the green and blue curves indicate the
maximum and the minimum numbers of neighbors, respectively,
while the box represents the range containing the first to third
quartiles and the line in the box shows the median. For large values
of r, a few red crosses are shown, indicating outliers.
In this experiment, we ran the algorithms under three settings
to examine the success rates for resilient consensus. Throughout
the simulations, the regular nodes’ initial values were randomly
chosen under uniform distribution in the interval [0,100]. On the
other hand, the adversary nodes were given negative values so that
their influence is easy to see. For the mobile adversaries, we used
the random model, under which at each time step, the malicious
agents randomly choose nodes to move from the entire network.
7.1 Consensus under Different Communication Radii
As we have observed in the theoretical results, the different models
in the adversaries require different levels of connectivities in the
network. In the first part of the simulations, we verify such prop-
erties of the algorithms by finding the smallest communication
radius over which resilient consensus becomes possible. Such a
communication radius will be referred to as the threshold radius.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
Communication radius r
0
20
40
60
80
100
N
um
be
r o
f n
ei
gh
bo
rs
 (d
eg
re
e)
Lower bound of neighbors
Upper bound of neighbors
Fig. 8. Average number of neighbors versus the communication radius r
In the simulations, we examined the five cases as follows:
(a) Conventional MSR protocol under the static model, (b) Proto-
col 1 under the M1 model, (c) Protocol 2 under the M2 model,
(d) Protocol 2A under the M2 model, and (e) Protocol 3 under
the M3 model. For each protocol, we checked four cases with
the parameters f = 5,10,15,20, where the actual numbers of
adversaries were taken as freal = f . The results are summarized
in Fig. 9, where the threshold radii are shown for the five cases
(a)–(e) from the left to right; the figure is given in the box plot
style for the 10 network topologies generated as explained above.
We can observe two general trends in the results: First, for
each protocol, as the number f of adversaries increases, the
threshold radius becomes larger. In the plots, the increase in the
threshold size seems to be linear in f for all five protocols. Second,
the malicious nature in the models of the adversaries gradually
becomes higher in the following order: the static model, M1,
M2, and M3. Correspondingly, in the plots, we can confirm that
from case (a) to case (d), the required levels of the threshold radii
become larger.
It is interesting that when we compare the cases (c) for Proto-
col 2 and (e) for Protocol 2A, which are both for the same model
M2, the thresholds are different. In fact, those for Protocol 2A are
larger, being comparable to those for Protocol 3 under M3. This
is because of the two cured rounds required in Protocol 2A since
these rounds lead the network to be less connected. Recall that in
Protocol 2A, the number of agents not sending their values can be
up to 2 f , while in Protocol 2, it is up to f . More specifically,
in Protocol 2A, the regular agents and the cured agents with
θi(k) = 2 remove less neighbor information than the regular agents
in Protocol 2. On the other hand, the cured agents in C (k) in
Protocol 2A remove the same numbers of neighbors as those in
Protocol 2.
We further note that the threshold results for cases (d) and
(e) exactly coincide though the adversary models as well as the
protocols are different. This is rather due to the special set up in the
current simulations. In case (d) for Protocol 3, each regular agent
always removes 4 f values from those received from neighbors.
On the other hand, in case (e) under the model M3, cured agents
do not send their values. Hence, since the malicious agents take
negative values, the regular agents employing Protocol 2A or 3
under the corresponding model are always successful in ignoring
the malicious agents’ values, resulting in the same behaviors and
thus the same threshold values.
7.2 When the Number of Malicious Agents is Unknown
In the first part of the simulations, we have assumed that the
number of the malicious agents in the network is known, that
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Fig. 9. Distribution of the threshold radii under five attack scenarios
is, f = freal. In this second part, we check the performance of
proposed algorithms when this does not hold, that is, the parameter
f used in the algorithm does not match the actual number freal of
malicious agents. Here, we fixed the parameter f in the protocols
at f = 5 and computed the success rates of resilient consensus by
changing two parameters: the number of real malicious agents as
freal ∈ {0,1, . . .,10} and the communication radius as r ∈ [20,70].
In Fig. 10, the results are shown in the heat map format for the
five cases (a)–(e) as in the previous part.
These plots reveal the sharp difference between the static and
mobile malicious models. Fig. 10(a) shows the results of the
conventional MSR algorithm under the static malicious model.
We can see that the success rate is quite low with r ≤ 30 as the
connectivity in the network is not enough. With r > 30, however,
enough connectivity is introduced in the networks, and resilient
consensus can be guaranteed in most topologies when freal ≤ f .
Moreover, under the static malicious model, an interesting
phenomenon occurs when more malicious agents exist in the
network with freal > f . Observe that the success rate is high when
30≤ r ≤ 40. In this range, the communication radius is relatively
small. Low connectivity in the network actually helps the regular
agents since there are certain chances for each regular agent to
receive fewer than f malicious values. The conventional MSR is
then able to achieve resilient consensus.
In contrast, under any of the mobile malicious models, this
does not happen, and it is critical to take the parameter f large
enough that freal ≤ f holds. In fact, in Figs. 10(b)–10(d), the
success rates almost immediately go to 0 once freal > f . In the
mobile models, the adversaries can switch among agents in the
network, so once freal > f holds, there is a large chance that
the regular agents receive more than f malicious values at some
time instants. After such moments, resilient consensus becomes
impossible to reach. Thus, in mobile models, resilient consensus
is very hard to guarantee when freal > f .
Furthermore, according to the malicious models, the sizes of
the region indicating high success rates are different. As we have
already seen in the previous part, the success rate becomes lower
as the model becomes more adversarial from case (b) to case (e).
It is interesting that under the model M2, for both Protocols 2
and 2A in Figs. 10(c) and Fig. 10(d), respectively, the success
rates are affected by the size of f even when the relation f ≥ freal
holds. This is because depending on the size of freal, the number
of cured agents is determined. Hence, as freal increases, the overall
system is under more uncertainties and its performance becomes
worse. Note that even between these two protocols, the decrease
in the success rates is different. Compared with the heat map for
Protocol 2 in Fig. 10(c), the one for Protocol 2A in Fig. 10(d)
indicates that the yellow region shrinks faster for larger freal. On
the other hand, in the results for Protocols 1 and 3 in Figs. 10(b)
and Fig. 10(e), respectively, the size of the parameter f has much
less impact on the chances of achieving resilient consensus. The
reason is that in both protocols, the regular agents always ignore
2 f values at each update and this number stays the same regardless
of the values received.
7.3 When the Mobile Malicious Model is Unknown
In the third part of the simulations, we introduce further uncer-
tainties in the setting. In addition to using the actual number freal
of malicious agents greater than the parameter f used in the algo-
rithms, we run the five protocols under different mobile models.
As in the previous part, we fix the parameter as f = 5. Then,
for two sets of network topologies, namely, with communication
radius r = 70 and r = 50, we performed simulations to calculate
the success rates of resilient consensus by changing freal from
0 to 10. For each case, the maximum freal under which resilient
consensus is reached in all 10 topologies was recorded. The results
are displayed in Tables 3 (a) and 3 (b) for r = 70 and r = 50,
respectively.
In what follows, we discuss the case of r = 70 with more
connectivities among the agents for the four adversary models:
(i) In the static model, all five protocols can achieve resilient
consensus under the 10 network topologies when the number
of malicious agents in the network is less than the bound, i.e.,
freal ≤ f . Protocol 3 is special in that it can tolerate up to 2 f = 10
malicious agents; this is because it ignores 2 f largest and smallest
neighbor values.
(ii) For the mobile model M1, we can check that the con-
ventional MSR fails to reach consensus as soon as one malicious
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(a) Conventional MSR in static model
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(b) Protocol 1 in M1
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(c) Protocol 2 in M2
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(d) Protocol 2A in M2
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(e) Protocol 3 in M3
Fig. 10. Success rates of resilient consensus versus the actual number freal of malicious agents and r in the regular agents with parameter f = 5
agent is introduced (with freal ≥ 1). In the meantime, the proposed
protocols perform well for this mobile model when freal ≤ f .
Again, Protocol 3 can further tolerate up to 2 f malicious agents.
Once the number freal exceeds the bound f = 5 (or 2 f = 10 for
Protocol 3), all protocols fail to reach resilient consensus for any
of the topologies.
(iii) For the mobile M2, it is clear that the conventional MSR
and Protocol 1 fail to reach consensus even with one malicious
agent in the network while other protocols work well. Note that
in this mobile model, Protocol 3 can tolerate only up to f = 5
malicious agents. Recall that the models M2 and M3 share similar
mobile behaviors, where the difference is that in M2, agents in
the cured rounds are aware. However, Protocol 3 does not use
this information and thus works the same as the case of M3. In
both models, there may be 2 f malicious values in the system in
each round. The success rates for all protocols go to zero when
freal > f .
(iv) Finally, we checked the performance under M3. It is
evident that except for Protocol 3, all protocols fail to reach
consensus even with one malicious agent. As seen in Fig. 10(e),
Protocol 3 is capable when sufficient connectivity is available, but
cannot tolerate more malicious agents than the bound f .
We now turn our attention to the case r = 50 with the smaller
communication radius. We have seen in Table 3 (a) that Protocol 3
can deal with all models when freal ≤ f , but this capability is
realized by requiring a high level of connectivities. It turns out that
with r = 50, the network is not connected enough for Protocol 3,
and it performs much worse than other protocols. In fact, as shown
in Table 3 (b), Protocol 3 cannot reach consensus in any of the 10
topologies. The conventional MSR, Protocols 1 and 2 have similar
performance as in the previous case with r = 70. Protocol 2A
has some differences in M2 in that resilient consensus can be
guaranteed in all 10 topologies when freal ≤ 2. Because of the
mobile behavior in M2, the increase in freal can lead to the increase
in cured agents at each round. Protocol 2A may have 2 freal cured
agents in one round. The cured agents do not send their values,
which can reduce the connectivities.
We summarize the three simulation parts discussed in this
section. The malicious agents become more adversarial according
to the order in their models: The static, M1, M2, and M3.
Protocols designed for more adversarial models are capable to
deal with agents under less powerful models. For example, all
mobile protocols can handle the static model, but the conventional
MSR cannot reach consensus under any mobile models. We also
confirmed through these simulations that protocols designed for
more adversarial models require more connectivities to guarantee
resilient consensus. These trade-offs are intuitive and can help the
design of network structures for resilient consensus.
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TABLE 3
The maximum of the actual number freal of malicious agents for
achieving resilient consensus when f = 5
(a) With larger communication radius r = 70
Adversary model
Algorithm Static M1 M2 M3
Conventional MSR 5 0 0 0
Protocol 1 5 5 0 0
Protocol 2 5 5 5 0
Protocol 2A 5 5 5 0
Protocol 3 10 10 5 5
(b) With smaller communication radius r = 50
Adversary model
Algorithm Static M1 M2 M3
Conventional MSR 5 0 0 0
Protocol 1 5 5 0 0
Protocol 2 5 5 5 0
Protocol 2A 5 5 2 0
Protocol 3 − − − −
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the multi-agent consensus
problem in the presence of mobile misbehaving agents and
have developed resilient protocols to mitigate their influence on
the regular agents. Specifically, under three classes of mobile
malicious agents, four protocols have been proposed. For the
protocols to achieve resilient consensus, we have characterized the
conditions on the necessary graph structures through theoretical
analyses under networks in both complete and non-complete graph
forms. We have observed that these conditions reflect the different
levels of adversarial capabilities that the three classes of mobile
malicious agents possess. By means of numerical simulations, we
have further studied the performance of the proposed resilient
consensus protocols for random networks of 100 nodes where the
theoretical conditions may not hold.
In future research, we will focus on formulating more detailed
models for mobile adversary behaviors. We would also like to
extend our approach to other multi-agent tasks where the adver-
sary’s mobile capabilities may create complexity in the responses
and actions of the regular agents for protecting the overall system.
Furthermore, asynchronous update behaviors as well as time
delays in communication should be taken into account.
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